The practice of private companies has long shown that the lack of protection for minority shareholders is more intense than in open or listed companies for which there is a liquid market in which to trade shares. The majority shareholders, and therefore the directors and officers appointed by the same, do not have the competitive pressure imposed by the existence of a genuine market for corporate control. This becomes more intense, at times even unbearable, in some models of closed companies, such as family businesses. This book provides a general analysis of the treatment of this issue in several of the most relevant legislations in the European Union.

Chapter 1. Control of the legality of transactions between a company and its directors or shareholders: legal regime applicable to related-party transactions under Spanish private company and its directors or shareholders: legal regime applicable to related-party transactions under Spanish private company law

Chapter 2. Shareholder conflicts in groups of private companies: the German perspective - including an analysis of the "ITT" case

Chapter 3. Protection of minorities in groups of closed companies

Chapter 4. Majority rule and minority protections: theoretical frameworks and national practice in the shadow of the EU: the case of Ireland

Chapter 5. Majority and minority shareholders in UK incorporated private companies; harmonisation - a valid goal?

Chapter 6. The members' rights of control in the Italian close companies: uses and abuses

Chapter 7. The shareholder-director's and director's duty to abstain in situations of conflict of interest in relation to the duty of loyalty in Spanish limited companies

Chapter 8. Conflicts of interest between majority and minority shareholders in private companies: Lithuanian approach

Chapter 9. The rights of the minority shareholder in the institutes of withdrawal and exclusion